The article covers four periods of institutionalization of extremism and terrorism in Tatarstan (from inter-ethnic conflict at the end of 1980-s, across radicalization of Tatar ethno-political movement and legitimacy crises at the beginning of 1990-s and birth of football fans’ extremism in 2000s to the conflict between quasi-religious terrorism and FSB in 2010s). The author elicits eight sources of quasi-religious extremism and terrorism. For the purpose of analysis of social roots of these negative phenomena there was conducted a youth opinion poll. The poll shows the prevalence of condemnation of any extremism. The rejection of extremism is not equivalent to social passivity. In the youth environment, we can see the relevance of social activism, rejection of humility with lack of rights and prevalence of legitimate and democratic channels to combat injustice. Religious extremism, in spite of clamorous actions, has not become popular with young people, as it has a too thin mobilization base. At the same time, another form of extremism – ethnic and linguistic radicalism, resulting from awkward policy of the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan in the sphere of education – began to grow on both sides (among the Tatars and Russians). Because of this, a very significant segment of the youth considers inter-ethnic relations in the republic tense and even conflict. Young people rarely see the manifestations of interethnic and interreligious intolerance in real life, unlike the Internet, where one third of respondents encounter them frequently and even constantly, and 4.1% of the respondents have a favorable reaction to such “encounters”, which seems very dangerous. The article proposes ten ways to counter extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Tatarstan.
The article covers four periods of institutionalization of extremism and terrorism in Tatarstan (from inter-ethnic conflict at the end of 1980-s, across radicalization of Tatar ethno-political movement and legitimacy crises at the beginning of 1990-s and birth of football fans’ extremism in 2000s to the conflict between quasi-religious terrorism and FSB in 2010s). The author elicits eight sources of quasi-religious extremism and terrorism. For the purpose of analysis of social roots of these negative phenomena there was conducted a youth opinion poll. The poll shows the prevalence of condemnation of any extremism. The rejection of extremism is not equivalent to social passivity. In the youth environment, we can see the relevance of social activism, rejection of humility with lack of rights and prevalence of legitimate and democratic channels to combat injustice. Religious extremism, in spite of clamorous actions, has not become popular with young people, as it has a too thin mobilization base. At the same time, another form of extremism – ethnic and linguistic radicalism, resulting from awkward policy of the authorities of the Republic of Tatarstan in the sphere of education – began to grow on both sides (among the Tatars and Russians). Because of this, a very significant segment of the youth considers inter-ethnic relations in the republic tense and even conflict. Young people rarely see the manifestations of interethnic and interreligious intolerance in real life, unlike the Internet, where one third of respondents encounter them frequently and even constantly, and 4.1% of the respondents have a favorable reaction to such “encounters”, which seems very dangerous. The article proposes ten ways to counter extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Tatarstan.